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THE RHETORICAL USES OF MARBURY v. MADISON: 
THE EMERGENCE OF A "GREAT CASE" 
Davison M. Douglas* 
Marbury v. Madison is today indisputably one of the "great 
cases" of American constitutional law because of its association 
with the principle of judicial review. But for much of its 
history, Marbury has not been regarded as a seminal decision. 
Between 1803 and 1887, the Supreme Court never once cited 
Marbury for the principle of judicial review, and nineteenth-
century constitutional law treatises were far more likely to cite 
Marbury for the decision's discussion of writs of mandamus or 
the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction than for its 
discussion of judicial review. During the late nineteenth 
century, however, the exercise of judicial review became far 
more controversial. Proponents of judicial review seized upon 
the Marbury decision to legitimize their claims for an expansive 
conception of the doctrine-particularly after the Court engaged 
in an extraordinarily controversial exercise of judicial review in 
1895 in the Pollock decisions declaring the newly enacted 
federal income tax unconstitutional. In the process, Marbury 
became, for the first time, a "great case"-as measured by its 
treatment in judicial opinions, legal treatises, and case books-
a moniker that would have been ill applied to the decision for 
most of the nineteenth century. Marbury's significance today 
cannot be attributed to the pathbreaking character of the 
decision. Rather, Marbury became "great" because proponents 
of an expansive doctrine of judicial review have needed it to 
assume greatness. 
During the past year, several law schools have held conferences 
to commemorate the bicentennial of the Supreme Court's 1803 
decision in Marbury v. Madison. 1 The prevalence of these 
* Arthur B. Hanson Professor of Law and Director, Institute of Bill of 
Rights Law, William and Mary School of Law. I thank Jennifer Becker, Sherri 
Campbell, Michael Gentry, and Shawn Gobble for their research assistance, 
and Neal Devins, Charles Hobson, and Michael Klarman for their helpful 
comments on an earlier draft of this Article. 
1. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). These law schools include Georgetown, 
George Washington, John Marshall, Maryland, Michigan, Tennessee, and Wake 
Forest. 
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conunemorations is not surprising. Marbury is widely regarded 
today as the most important case in American constitutional 
history.2 
These conunemorations are not the first celebrations of the 
greatness of the Marbury decision. A century ago, Marbury enjoyed 
similar glowing attention. At the centennial celebration of Chief 
Justice John Marshall's appointment in 1901, speaker after speaker 
waxed eloquent about the sublime virtues of Marshall's Marbury 
decision. "If an addition is ever made to the number of days 
celebrated as national anniversaries," Harvard law professor 
Jeremiah Smith exclaimed, "I submit that the twenty-fourth of 
February [the date of the Marbury decision] may well be added to 
the list."3 Arkansas Judge U.M. Rose claimed that "[n]ext to the 
formation of our government the decision in Marbury v. Madison is 
perhaps the most important event in our history.')'! California 
lawyer Horace Platt characterized Marbury "as great a document as 
the Bill of Rights, as far-reaching as the Declaration of 
Independence, as essential to the healthy development of our 
Government under the Constitution as the Constitution itself."5 
This praise for Marbury was not directed at the decision's treatment 
of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction or its discussion of the 
proper uses of writs of mandamus. Rather, these proponents of the 
glories of Marbury focused on the decision's discussion of the 
principle of judicial review. 
Yet this glowing praise of Marbury in 1901 bore a certain irony. 
The Supreme Court itself, during the prior century, had rarely even 
cited Marbury's discussion of judicial review. Between 1803 and 
1887, the Court never once cited Marbury for the proposition of 
judicial review, even when the Court issued highly controversial 
decisions such as Dred Scott v. Sandford6 or the Civil Rights Cases7 
2. See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 567 
(1985) (Powell, J., dissenting) (calling Marbury "the most famous case in our 
history"); JETHRO K. LIEBERMAN, MILESTONES! 200 YEARS OF AMERICAN LAW: 
MILESTONES IN OUR LEGAL HISTORY vi-vii (1976) (1974 American Bar 
Association poll of lawyers, judges, and law professors ranks Marbury u. 
Madison as the most important Supreme Court ruling in American history). 
3. 1 JOHN MARSHALL: LIFE, CHARACTER AND JUDICIAL SERVICES 141 (John 
F. Dillon ed., 1903) [hereinafter LIFE, CHARACTER AND JUDICIAL SERVICES]. 
4. 3 id. at 130. 
5. 3 id. at 231. 
6. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). The controversial nature of the Dred 
Scott decision is beyond dispute. 
7. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). The Court's decision in the Civil Rights Cases 
outraged blacks throughout the nation, particularly in the North. The decision 
prompted the establishment of new civil rights organizations across the North 
(including two hundred in Ohio alone), and led to the enactment of anti-
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striking down important congressional legislation. Indeed, a 
perusal of the Court's use of Marbury during the nineteenth century 
suggests that the decision had far greater importance for its 
discussion of writs of mandamus or the Court's original jurisdiction 
than for its discussion of judicial review. Similarly, an examination 
of nineteenth-century constitutional law treatises suggests that 
most legal scholars did not regard Marbury as a seminal decision 
establishing the principle of judicial review. In fact, nineteenth-
century treatises were more likely to cite Marbury as authority on 
questions pertaining to writs of mandamus, executive power, or the 
Court's original jurisdiction, than for the principle of judicial 
• 8 
reVIew. 
But during the late nineteenth century, the issue of judicial 
review became ensnared with the highly contentious public debate 
over state regulation of private economic affairs-particularly 
regulation designed to ameliorate the effects of industrialization, 
corral the power of concentrated wealth, and protect the interests of 
labor. Many conservative legal scholars, jurists, and politicians 
urged the courts to exercise judicial review more aggressively in 
order to curb reform efforts that interfered with private property 
and contract rights. Many reformers, on the other hand, attacked 
the courts for thwarting the will of the people through judicial 
review and establishing a "judicial oligarchy." 
Proponents of judicial review during the late nineteenth century 
seized upon the Marbury decision and its author, Chief Justice John 
Marshall, to legitimize their claims for an expansive conception of 
the doctrine-particularly after the Court engaged in an 
extraordinarily controversial exercise of judicial review in 1895, 
declaring the newly enacted federal income tax unconstitutional.9 In 
the struggle to defend the Court's actions, judicial review 
enthusiasts elevated the Marbury decision-and Chief Justice John 
Marshall-to icon status to fend off attacks that the Court had acted 
in an unwarranted fashion. In the process, Marbury became, for the 
first time, a "great case"-as measured by its treatment in judicial 
opinions, legal treatises, and casebooks-a moniker that would have 
discrimination legislation in eleven northern and western states within two 
years. Davison M. Douglas, Contract Rights and Civil Rights, 100 MICH. L. 
REV. 1541, 1555 (2002); Valeria W. Weaver, The Failure of Civil Rights 1875-
1883 and Its Repercussions, 54 J . NEGRO HIST. 368, 373-75 (1969). 
8. See infra text accompanying notes 34-46. 
9. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. , 157 U.S. 429, 583 (1895) (holding 
unconstitutional tax on income derived from real estate), modified, 158 U.S. 
601, 637 (1895) (extending principle of earlier decision to income derived from 
personal property and thereby declaring unconstitutional the entire 1894 
graduated income tax). 
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been ill applied to the decision for most of the nineteenth century. 
During the twentieth century, particularly after the onset of the 
Warren Court, the exercise of judicial review has remained 
controversial. Once again, Marbury has been deployed in the debate 
over judicial review. During the past half century, justices on the 
Court in high-profile exercises of judicial review of both legislation 
and executive action have increasingly called upon Marbury to 
justifY their actions, far more frequently than at any time in the 
Court's history. For both conservative and liberal justices, Marbury 
has become an important rhetorical tool in the ongoing debate about 
the Court's proper role in American constitutional government. But 
the justices have used Marbury not only to defend judicial review in 
controversial cases. They have also embraced Marbury for other 
instrumental purposes-in particular, to make the Court's 
interpretations of constitutional text preeminent over those of other 
governmental actors, a move that constituted an extension of 
Marbury itself. 
Today, Marbury u. Madison is regarded as the central decision 
in the canon of American constitutional law. But its greatness rests 
not on its intrinsic qualities as a legal decision nor on its historical 
significance in 1803. Rather, Marbury enjoys greatness because the 
doctrine with which it is so intimately associated-judicial review-
has become such a significant feature of our constitutional structure. 
I. JUDICIAL REVIEW PRIOR TO MARBURY 
Although many lawyers and law students view Marbury as 
establishing the principle of judicial review, in fact, judicial review 
enjoyed considerable support prior to John Marshall's 1803 
decision.10 Even prior to the Constitutional Convention of 1787, a 
few state courts had either exercised judicial review or conceded the 
legitimacy of the principle, 11 though this early use of judicial review 
10. For a recent and persuasive summary of the evidence for the acceptance 
of judicial review prior to Marbury, see Michael J. Klarman, How Great Were 
the "Great" Marshall Court Decisions?, 87 VA. L. REV. 1111, 1113-17 (2001). 
11. See, e.g., Holmes v. Walton (N.J. 1780) (court holds a state statute 
providing for jury with six members in violation of state constitution); Rutgers 
v. Waddington (Mayor's Ct., City of N.Y. 1784) (court stated in dicta that a state 
statute violated the law of nations and a treaty with Great Britain); Bayard v. 
Singleton, 1 Martin 42 (N.C. 1787) (court strikes down a state confiscation law 
relating to loyalist property); Trevett v. Weedon (Super. Ct. of R.I. 1786) (court 
refuses to hear a prosecution of defendant for refusing to accept paper money as 
legal tender; decision was widely understood as holding invalid state law 
providing for issuance of paper money as legal tender); Commonwealth v. 
Caton, 8 Va. (4 Call.) 5, 8 (1782) (court strikes down Virginia statute granting 
pardon, noting that if the "whole legislature . . . should attempt to overleap the 
2003] EMERGENCE OF A "GREAT CASE" 379 
was not widespread and in some instances highly controversial.12 At 
the 1787 Convention and the state ratifying debates, the framers 
discussed judicial review, with supporters of the concept 
outnumbering opponents.13 
During the 1790s, the use of judicial review became more 
common. Some state courts, particularly in Virginia, continued to 
strike down statutes under state constitutions.14 Moreover, a few 
bounds, prescribed to them by the people, I, in administering the public justice 
of the country, will meet the united powers, at my seat in this tribunal; and, 
pointing to the constitution, will say, to them, here is the limit of your 
authority; and, hither, shall you go, but no further"). These cases, except for 
Holmes v. Walton, are reproduced in JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, CASES ON 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 55-80 (1894). For a discussion of these and other pre-1787 
judicial review cases, see CHARLES GROVE HAINES, THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF 
JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 88-112 (1959); CHARLES F. HOBSON, THE GREAT CHIEF 
JUSTICE: JOHN MARSHALL AND THE RULE OF LAW 63-64 (1996); CHARLES WARREN, 
CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE SUPREME COURT 43-50 (1935); Austin 
Scott, Holmes vs. Walton: The New Jersey Precedent, 4 AM. HIST. REV. 456 
(1899); William Michael Treanor, The Case of the Prisoners and the Origins of 
Judicial Review, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 491 (1994). 
12. For example, when a New York Mayor's Court in 1784 suggested in 
dicta the principle of judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation, see 
supra note 11, the decision provoked a sharp rebuke from the New York 
General Assembly which attacked the decision as "subversive of good order and 
the sovereignty of the state," and leading "directly to anarchy and confusion." 
HAINES, supra note 11, at 101-03; L.B. Boudin, Government by Judiciary, 26 
POL. SCI. Q. 238, 245-46 (1911). In Rhode Island, after the justices of the 
Superior Court rendered a decision perceived as holding a state statute 
unconstitutional, see supra note 11, the General Assembly directed the justices 
in question to appear before the Assembly to explain their decision; in the next 
election, all but one of the justices were defeated. HAINES, supra note 11, at 
109-12; Boudin, supra, at 246-47. 
13. Klarman, supra note 10, at 1114. Among the supporters were Elbridge 
Gerry of Massachusetts, who noted that "[i]n some States, the Judges had 
actually set aside laws as being against the Constitution. This was done too 
with general approbation." WARREN, supra note 11, at 50. Luther Martin 
suggested that "[a]s to the constitutionality of laws, that point will come before 
the Judges in their proper official character." Id. Charles Warren counted 
twenty-two other members of the Constitutional Convention as expressing 
support for judicial review either contemporaneous with the Convention or 
within a few years thereafter. Id. at 50-51; see, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 
394 (Alexander Hamilton) (Gary Wills ed., 1982) (asserting the duty of the 
courts "to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the constitution 
void"). By the same token, Warren reports that only four members of the 
Convention were clear opponents to judicial review. WARREN, supra note 11, at 
51. 
14. See, e.g., Kamper v. Hawkins, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 20 (1793). But not 
everyone embraced this use of judicial review. In 1807 and 1808, judges in Ohio 
were impeached for holding acts of the Ohio state legislature unconstitutional. 
James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of 
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lower federal courts struck down state statutes as violative of the 
federal Constitution, decisions which provoked minimal adverse 
response. 15 All of the Supreme Court justices, while riding circuit, 
assumed the power of judicial review in Rayburn's Case16 in 1792. 
In 1795, Justice William Paterson in Vanhorne's Lessee v. 
Dorrance,17 also while riding circuit, declared a Pennsylvania statute 
to be unconstitutional.18 In Hylton v. United States, 19 the Court 
refused to resolve a case on the basis of judicial review, but 
nevertheless signaled the Court's acknowledgment of the legitimacy 
of the theory.20 When the Kentucky and Virginia legislatures 
threatened nullification of the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 as 
unconstitutional, five of the seven states that responded argued that 
only courts could nullify unconstitutional legislation. 21 Leading 
theorists, such as James Kent, championed judicial review during 
the 1790s. 22 
Thus, by the time of Marbury, the principle of judicial review 
was reasonably well established. Not surprisingly, the judicial 
review aspect of the Marbury decision received little notice, 
suggesting that Marshall's claims with respect to the authority of 
Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 133-34 (1893). 
15. Klarman, supra note 10, at 1115. 
16. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792); WILLIAM R. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN 
THE EARLY REPUBLIC: THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIPS OF JOHN JAY AND OLIVER 
ELLSWORTH 175-78 (1995); Klarman, supra note 10, at 1115-16. 
17. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304 (1795). 
18. Id. at 320 ("The confirming act is unconstitutional and void."). 
19. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796). 
20. CASTO, supra note 16, at 101-05; Klarman, supra note 10, at 1115-16; 
see also Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 399 (1798) (Iredell, J., concurring) 
("If any act of Congress, or of the Legislature of a state, violates those 
constitutional provisions, it is unquestionably void .... "). 
21. Klarman, supra note 10, at 1116. Those states were Massachusetts, 
New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont. FrankL. Peckham, Is 
the Supreme Court Guilty of "Usurpation"?, in CONGRESS OR THE SUPREME 
COURT: WHICH SHALL RULE AMERICA? 251-52 (Egbert Ray Nichols ed., 1935). 
22. Kent, in his inaugural lecture at King's College in 1794, assumed the 
legitimacy of judicial review: 
No question can be made with us, but that the acts of the 
legislative body, contrary to the true intent and meaning of the 
Constitution, ought to be absolutely null and void. The only inquiry 
which can arise in the subject is, whether the legislature is not of 
itself the competent judge of its own constitutional limits . . . or 
whether the business of determining ... is not rather the fit and 
exclusive province of the courts of justice .... The courts of justice 
which are organized with peculiar advantages to exempt them from 
the baneful influence of faction ... are ... the most proper power in 
the government to keep the legislature within the limits of its duty, 
and to maintain the authority of the Constitution. 
James Kent, Kent's Introductory Lecture, 3 COLUM. L. REV. 330, 335-36 (1903). 
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the courts to assess the constitutionality of legislation was not 
controversial. Indeed, critics of the decision, including Thomas 
Jefferson, directed their ire not at the decision's exercise of judicial 
review,23 but rather at the separation of powers implications of the 
suggestion that the Court might issue a writ of mandamus to a 
Cabinet official. That the discussion of judicial review in Marbury 
would someday cause the decision to be considered "the most famous 
case in our history''24 could not have been predicted in 1803. 
II. MARBURY DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 
Not surprisingly, Marbury was not considered a "great case" 
during most of the nineteenth century, a time of limited judicial 
review by the Supreme Court. The notion of judicial review of 
congressional statutes was not controversial during the Marshall or 
Taney courts, in significant measure because of its sparing use. 25 As 
Daniel Farber notes in his contribution to this Symposium, the 
Supreme Court's decisions demarking the relationship between the 
Court and the states proved far more controversial during the 
antebellum era than did Marbury's assertion of the right of the 
Court to assess the constitutionality of a congressional statute.26 
Moreover, prior to the Civil War, the Court received more criticism 
for the deference it showed Congress in cases such as McCulloch v. 
Maryland,'2:7 than for its use of judicial review to void congressional 
legislation in Marbury. Between 1803 and 1864, the Supreme Court 
struck down only one congressional statute-portions of the 1820 
Missouri Compromise in Dred Scott28-a decision in which the Court 
23. ROBERT LOWRY CLINTON, MARBURY V. MADISON AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 
102 (1989) (noting that the Court's exercise of judicial review in Marbury was 
"either approved or ignored"); HOWARD E. DEAN, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND 
DEMOCRACY 27 (1966) (noting that "even the most bitterly partisan Jeffersonian 
newspapers did not attack Marshall's assertion of the power of judicial review"); 
Klarman, supra note 10, at 1117 (noting that "Marshall's critics had no gripe 
with him" for exercising judicial review in Marbury). To be sure, judicial review 
would remain controversial in a few states after the Marbury decision. For 
example, after Marbury, state court judges in both Ohio and Rhode Island were 
impeached (though not removed) for refusing to enforce unconstitutional 
statutes. During the 1820s, Kentucky was roiled by a series of efforts, 
eventually unsuccessful, to impeach judges who declared state statutes 
unconstitutional. 1 LIFE, CHARACTER AND JUDICIAL SERVICES, supra note 3, at 
143-44. 
24. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 567 (1985) 
(Powell, J., dissenting). 
25. CLINTON, supra note 23, at 161. 
26. See Daniel A. Farber, Judicial Review and Its Alternatives: An 
American Tale, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 415, 417 (2003). 
27. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
28. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 452 (1857). 
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failed to even mention Marbury. The Court also declared 
unconstitutional many state laws during the antebellum era, but 
again without explicitly relying upon the Marbury decision. To the 
extent that the Court cited Marbury at all during the antebellum 
era, it did so for the decision's discussion of writs of mandamus or 
original jurisdiction, not judicial review. 29 
After the Civil War, the Court began to use judicial review to 
strike down federal and state legislation more frequently. Between 
1865 and 1894, the Court declared congressional statutes 
unconstitutional in nineteen decisions.30 In none of those nineteen 
exercises of judicial review did the Court cite Marbury. 31 By the 
same token, between 1865 and 1898, the Court struck down 171 
state laws;32 again, the Court cited Marbury for the principle of 
judicial review in none of those cases.33 The Supreme Court did cite 
Marbury approximately fifty times between 1803 and 1894, but in 
almost all of those decisions the Court cited Marbury on issues 
pertaining to writs of mandamus or the Supreme Court's 
jurisdiction. 
In a similar fashion, nineteenth-century legal scholars, for the 
most part, did not emphasize the connection between Marbury and 
the principle of judicial review. The two most significant 
constitutional law treatises of the early nineteenth century, by 
James Kent and Joseph Story, did cite Marbury for establishing the 
proposition of judicial review.34 Most subsequent constitutional law 
29. As Robert Clinton has noted, during the antebellum era, the Supreme 
Court "regarded Marbury v. Madison as having settled either a narrow 
jurisdictional question or a technical issue relating to the mandamus remedy." 
CLINTON, supra note 23, at 162. 
30. WILFRED C. GILBERT, PROVISIONS OF FEDERAL LAW HELD 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL BY THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 2-29 (Univ. 
Publ'ns of Am. 1975) (1936); WILLIAM E. NELSON, MARBURY V. MADISON: THE 
ORIGINS AND LEGACY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 87 (2000). 
31. Moreover, in none of those cases did the Court cite any prior decision to 
justify its exercise of judicial review, suggesting the noncontroversial nature of 
the doctrine. 
32. CLINTON, supra note 23, at 162. 
33. In Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887), however, the Court, though it 
sustained the constitutionality of a Kansas statute prohibiting the manufacture 
and sale of liquor, did, citing Marbury, reaffirm its authority to assess the 
constitutionality of state legislation. The decision in Mugler is the first time 
that the Court ever cited Marbury in connection with the principle of judicial 
review of legislation. 
34. 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 424 (Bernard D. 
Reams, Jr. ed., William S. Hein & Co. 1984) (1826) (claiming that "[t]he power 
and duty of the judiciary to disregard an unconstitutional act of congress, or of 
any state legislature, were declared" in Marbury); 3 JOSEPH STORY, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES; WITH PRELIMINARY 
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treatises, however, did not. A perusal of nineteenth-century 
constitutional law treatises published after Kent and Story suggests 
that Marbury's significance lay in its discussion of writs of 
mandamus and the Court's original jurisdiction, not its treatment of 
the principle of judicial review. 
Former Columbia president William Alexander Duer, for 
example, in his 1856 revised edition of his 1843 treatise 
Constitutional Jurisprudence of the United States, while discussing 
the judicial power, made the assertion that "[i]f an Act of Congress 
be repugnant to the Constitution, it is ipso facto void; and the 
Courts have the power, and it is their duty so to declare it."35 Duer 
then cited more than sixty decisions in which state or federal courts, 
including the U.S. Supreme Court, had declared either 
congressional statutes, state statutes, or state constitutional 
provisions inconsistent with the U.S. Constitution.36 Remarkably, 
Marbury is absent from Duer's lengthy list of cases in which courts 
had exercised judicial review of legislation. In fact, Duer's only 
mention of Marbury is in connection with a discussion of the original 
jurisdiction of the Court.37 
Thomas Cooley, an enthusiastic proponent of judicial review, in 
his influential 1868 treatise Constitutional Limitations38 devoted 
thirty pages to a consideration "Of the Circumstances Under Which 
a Legislative Enactment May Be Declared Unconstitutional" 
without ever discussing or even mentioning Marbury even though 
REVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE COLONIES AND STATES, BEFORE 
THE ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION § 701 (1833) (citing Marbury for the "duty 
of courts of justice to declare any unconstitutional law passed by congress or a 
state legislature void"). But for an early nineteenth-century treatise that did 
not associate Marbury with judicial review, see BENJAMIN L. OLIVER, THE 
RIGHTS OF AN AMERICAN CITIZEN: WITH A COMMENTARY ON STATE RIGHTS, AND ON 
THE CONSTITUTION AND POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES 123-24 (Books for 
Libraries Press 1970) (1832) (citing Marbury briefly only in connection with a 
discussion of writs of mandamus). 
35. WILLIAM ALEXANDER DUER, A COURSE OF LECTURES ON THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 126 (2d ed. 1856). 
Duer's treatise was based on lectures that he had delivered each year to 
students at Columbia. I d. at xi. 
36. ld. at 126 n.l. 
37. Id. at 138-39. 
38. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 
WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN 
UNION (1868) [hereinafter COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
LIMITATIONS]. Cooley was an enormously influential legal scholar, educator, 
and jurist and his treatise was the most cited commentary on constitutional law 
of the latter half of the nineteenth century. BENJAMIN R. TwiSS, LAWYERS AND 
THE CONSTITUTION: HOW LAISSEZ F AIRE CAME TO THE SUPREME COURT 34 (Russell 
& Russell, Inc. 1962) (1942). 
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he did discuss many other cases involving exercises of judicial 
review.39 Moreover, in his 1880 The General Principles of 
Constitutional Law in the United States of America, essentially a 
student constitutional law hornbook, Cooley also downplayed 
Marbury's relevance to judicial review, citing the case only in 
connection with discussions of the authority of executive officers, 
presidential commissions, the Court's original jurisdiction, and the 
ability of judicial process to reach the President.4° Cooley did 
discuss judicial review in this hornbook, claiming that "the judiciary 
is the final authority in the construction of the Constitution and the 
laws, and its construction should be received and followed by the 
other departments," but did not cite Marbury as authority for that 
proposition. 41 
Other treatises published during the second half of the 
nineteenth century also ignored the Marbury decision in their 
discussion of judicial review. John Norton Pomeroy, dean of the law 
school at New York University, in his 1868 treatise An Introduction 
to the Constitutional Law of the United States, cited Marbury only in 
connection with writs of mandamus and the Supreme Court's 
original jurisdiction, not in connection with judicial review.42 To 
support his claim that "the national Judiciary is the final arbiter as 
to the meaning of the Constitution," and possesses the power to 
assess "the validity of a statute of Congress or of a state legislature," 
Pomeroy cited four Supreme Court decisions, but not Marbury.43 
Supreme Court Justice Samuel Miller, who served on the Court 
from 1862 until his death in 1890, described Marbury in an 1889 
lecture as a "very lengthy, and an exhaustive discussion of the 
power of a court of law to compel officers by the writ of mandamus 
to discharge duties which it is clear they are bound to perform, and 
in regard to which they have no discretion."44 Justice Miller, whose 
39. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, supra note 
38, at 159-88. Cooley, in another section of his treatise, did cite Marbury on one 
occasion-as one of the "very numerous authorities upon the subject" of the 
"right and the power of the courts" to assess the constitutionality of legislative 
pronouncements. Id. at 45-46 & n.l. In subsequent editions of his famous 
treatise published over the course of the next thirty years, Cooley gave the 
Marbury decision no greater emphasis. 
40. THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 115, 119, 128-29, 175-76 (Andrew C. 
McLaughlin ed., 3d ed. 1898). 
41. Id. at 158. In fact, Cooley offered no case support for this claim. Id. 
42. JOHN NORTON POMEROY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
OF THE UNITED STATES 419, 423, 516 (1868). 
43. Id. at 95-96. 
44. SAMUEL FREEMAN MILLER, LECTURES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES 385 (J.C. Bancroft Davis ed., 1891). This lecture was given in 
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constitutional law lectures were published posthumously in 1891, 
underscored the importance of the decision's treatment of writs of 
mandamus issue: 
The immense importance of this decision [Marbury] ... may be 
appreciated when it is understood that the principles declared 
. . . subjected the ministerial and executive officers of the 
Government, all over the country, to the control of the courts, 
in regard to the execution of a large part of their duties. Its 
application to the very highest officers of the Government, 
except perhaps the President himself, has been illustrated in 
numerous cases in the courts of the United States . ... 45 
But Justice Miller made no mention of the Marbury decision's 
discussion of judicial review of legislation in his constitutional law 
lectures. 
As a final example of a nineteenth-century treatise that 
understated the importance of Marbury, John Burgess, dean of the 
faculty of political science at Columbia, published a two-volume 
treatise in 1893, Political Science and Comparative Constitutional 
Law, in which he discussed judicial review but without reference to 
Marbury. Burgess cited Marbury only in his discussion of the 
commissioning ofjudges and the Court's originaljurisdiction.46 
1889. 1 LIFE, CHARACTER AND JUDICIAL SERVICES, supra note 3, at 360. 
45. MILLER, supra note 44, at 386. 
46. 2 JOHN W. BURGESS, POLITICAL SCIENCE AND COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 322-23, 329 (1890). One other nineteenth-century 
constitutional law treatise writer who did not cite Marbury for the principle of 
judicial review was University of Missouri law professor Christopher Tiedeman. 
Tiedeman noted that "[w]henever an act of the legislature contravenes a 
constitutional provision, it is void, and it is the duty of the courts so to declare 
it." CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF POLICE 
POWER IN THE UNITED STATES: CONSIDERED FROM BOTH A CIVIL AND CRIMINAL 
STANDPOINT 5 (1886) [hereinafter TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF 
THE POLICE POWER]. Tiedeman cited neither Marbury nor any other case for 
that proposition. 
To be sure, a few nineteenth-century constitutional law treatises did 
cite Marbury for the principle of judicial review. Theodore Sedgewick's 1857 
treatise, The Interpretation and Construction of Statutory and Constitutional 
Law, citing James Kent's Commentaries on American Law, supra note 34, noted 
that "courts of justice ... have, since the earliest days of our republic, steadily 
and vigorously applied" the doctrine of judicial review, and indicated that the 
"doctrine may be considered as having been finally settled in Marbury us. 
Madison." THEODORE SEDGEWICK, A TREATISE ON THE RULES WHICH GOVERN 
THE INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 216 (1857). In the context of discussing various exercises of judicial review 
in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Sedgewick also notes that 
the "principle [of judicial review was] deliberately and definitively settled" in 
Marbury. Id. at 479. 
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In part, the dearth of references to Marbury in both judicial 
opinions and constitutional law treatises reflected the fact that for 
much of the nineteenth century, the issue of judicial review itself 
was far less controversial than the issue of what its proper scope 
should be.47 Many treatises of the post-Civil War era, for example, 
spent considerably more space discussing the question whether 
courts should strike down statutes that offended notions of "natural 
justice" as opposed to a specific constitutional provision,48 than they 
did discussing the principle of judicial review itself. 
III. MARBURYDURINGTHE POPULIST AND PROGRESSIVE ERAS 
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the 
issue of judicial review became far more controversial, as courts 
began to exercise judicial review far more frequently than ever 
before. This expanded use of judicial review, in response to an array 
of legislative reform efforts designed to ameliorate the effects of 
rapid industrialization and to protect the interests of workers, 
provoked intense controversy. Proponents of judicial review utilized 
Marbury to defend their position. After ninety years of relative 
insignificance as a decision associated with judicial review, Marbury 
Columbia law professor John Ordronaux's 1891 Constitutional 
Legislation in the United States, noted that "the laws of the United States, 
themselves, are only valid when made in pursuance of the Constitution; and 
any enactment, whether Federal or State, which is repugnant to it, is void, 
being in violation of this fundamental law." JOHN 0RDRONAUX, CONSTITUTIONAL 
LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES: ITS ORIGIN, AND APPLICATION TO THE 
RELATIVE POWERS OF CONGRESS, AND OF STATE LEGISLATURES 210 (1891). 
Ordronaux relies on Marbury for this proposition, along with five other cases, 
including the Supreme Court's 1792 decision in Rayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 
409 (1792). /d. at 210 n.l. Ordronaux, however, offered a limited 
characterization of the doctrine of judicial review. Citing Marbury along with 
several cases and treatises, he claimed that "the decisions of even our highest 
courts are accepted as a finality only in relation to the particular cases with 
which they happen to deal, and their judgments do not impose compulsory 
limitations upon the action of any other department." /d. at 420. 
47. NELSON, supra note 30, at 86-87 (noting that by the middle of the 
nineteenth century, "judicial review had become an accepted feature of 
American law .... With the doctrine firmly established, judges began to 
exercise their power of review with greater frequency, and ... in a fashion that 
involved them in substantial controversy."). 
48. For example, both Thomas Cooley and Christopher Tiedeman in their 
treatises engaged in lengthy discussions of the question whether, in Tiedeman's 
words, courts could "declare an act of the legislature void, because it violates 
some abstract rule of justice, when there is no constitutional prohibition." 
TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF THE POLICE POWER, supra note 46, 
at 5-13; see also COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, 
supra note 38, at 164-70. 
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became an important precedent for courts and commentators 
seeking to justify the exercise of judicial review. In the process, 
Marbury became, for many, one of the "great cases" of American 
constitutional law. 
During the 1880s and early 1890s, a number of jurists and legal 
scholars expressed alarm at the growth in state and federal 
legislation regulating eccnomic affairs. University of Missouri law 
professor Christopher Tiedeman, for example, in his influential1886 
treatise Limitations of Police Power in the United States, wrote with 
great passion about the dangers oflegislative excess: 
Socialism, Communism, and Anarchism are rampant 
throughout the civilized world. The State is called on to 
protect the weak against the shrewdness of the stronger, to 
determine what wages a workman shall receive for his labor, 
and how many hours daily he shall labor .... The demands of 
Socialists and Communists vary in degree and in detail, and 
the most extreme of them insist upon the assumption by 
government of the paternal character altogether .... 
Contemplating these extraordinary demands of the great 
army of discontents, and their apparent power, with the 
growth and development of universal suffrage, to enforce their 
views of civil polity upon the civilized world, the conservative 
classes stand in constant fear of the advent of an absolutism 
more tyrannical and more unreasoning than any before 
experienced by man, the absolutism of a democratic majority. 
49 
Supreme Court Justice David Brewer expressed similar 
concerns about legislative excess in his 1892 dissenting opinion in 
Budd v. New York/,o in which the Court upheld a New York statute 
regulating the fees of grain elevators against a constitutional 
challenge: "The paternal theory of government is to me odious. The 
utmost possible liberty to the individual, and the fullest possible 
protection to him and his property, is both the limitation and duty of 
government. "51 
49. TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF THE POLICE POWER, supra 
note 46, at vi-vii. 
50. 143 U.S. 517, 549-52 (1892) (Brewer, J., dissenting). 
51. Id. at 551. Other late nineteenth-century lawyers also expressed 
concern about the excesses of legislatures. Former U.S. Senator Waitman 
Willey of West Virginia addressed his state's bar association in 1887 and spoke 
of the need for lawyers to impose "a wholesome check upon those tendencies to 
licentiousness and disorder incident to popular institutions." ARNOLD M. PAUL, 
CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE OF LAW: ATTITUDES OF BAR AND BENCH, 
1887-1895, at 21 (1960). Similarly, Georgia attorney I.E. Shumate, in an 1887 
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Both Tiedeman and Brewer called on courts to enforce both 
constitutional and "natural rights" norms against legislative 
excess. 
52 In an 1887 lecture subsequently published in his 1890 
book, The Unwritten Constitution of the United States, Tiedeman 
articulated an expansive vision of "natural rights" which courts 
must enforce against legislative encroachment: 
Under the stress of economical relations, the clashing of 
private interests, the conflicts of labor and capital, the old 
superstition that government has the power to banish evil 
from the earth . . . has been revived; and all these so-called 
natural rights, which the framers of our constitutions declared 
to be inalienable, and the violation of which they pronounced 
to be a just cause for rebellion, are in imminent danger of 
serious infringement .... 
In these days of great social unrest, we applaud the disposition 
of the courts to seize hold of these general declaration of rights 
as an authority for them to lay their interdict upon all 
legislative acts which interfere with the individual's natural 
rights, even though these acts do not violate any specific or 
special provision of the Constitution .... 53 
address to his state's bar association, worried about the increase in legislative 
regulation of private affairs which he feared was "affecting the conduct of 
almost every branch of business and controlling the private conduct of men in 
all relations of life." !d. at 22. Shumate criticized the courts for their failure to 
control this legislative activity. !d. at 22-23. 
52. Tiedeman, for example, wrote: 
[U]nder the written constitutions, Federal and State, democratic 
absolutism is impossible in this country, as long as the popular 
reverence for the constitutions, in their restrictions upon 
governmental activity, is nourished and sustained by a prompt 
avoidance by the courts of any violations of their provisions, in word 
or in spirit. 
TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF THE POLICE POWER, supra note 46, 
at vii. 
53. CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, THE UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY INTO THE FUNDAMENTALS OF 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 79-82 (1890) (emphasis added). Tiedeman went 
on to define the scope of these "natural rights": 
[T]he doctrine of natural rights may be tersely stated to be a freedom 
from all legal restraint that is not needed to prevent injury to others; 
... or, to employ the language of Herbert Spencer: "Every man has 
freedom to do aught that he wills, provided he infringes not the equal 
freedom of any other man." 
!d. at 76 (footnote omitted) (quoting HERBERT SPENCER, SOCIAL STATICS; OR, THE 
CONDITIONS ESSENTIAL TO HUMAN HAPPINESS SPECIFIED, AND THE FIRST OF THEM 
DEVELOPED 121 (1851)). 
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Similarly, in 1893, in a speech to the New York State Bar 
Association, Justice Brewer offered a robust defense of the role of 
courts in the protection of individual liberty through judicial review. 
Like Tiedeman, Brewer urged the courts to protect economic liberty 
not just under the Constitution but also with reference to principles 
of natural law: 
The courts ... make no laws, they establish no policy, they 
never enter into the domain of popular action. They do not 
govern. Their functions in relation to the State are limited to 
seeing that popular action does not trespass upon right and 
justice as it exists in written constitutions and natural law. 54 
During the 1880s and 1890s, many state courts began to 
exercise judicial review more frequently, striking down state 
legislation that infringed private contract and property rights. 55 
These decisions delighted conservatives like Tiedeman and Brewer, 
but dismayed social reformers, such as Populist James Weaver. 56 In 
54. Quoted in CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, THE RISE OF MODERN JUDICIAL REVIEW: 
FROM CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION TO JUDGE-MADE LAW 157 (rev. ed. 1994) 
(emphasis added). See also David J. Brewer, Protection to Private Property from 
Public Attack, 256 YALE REV. 97, 103 (1891) (appealing to "natural justice" as 
demanding protection for private property). 
Other justices of the U.S. Supreme Court also appealed to natural law 
principles to reject legislation. In Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678 (1888), 
Justice Stephen Field dissented from the Court's decision upholding a 
Pennsylvania statute prohibiting the manufacture of oleomargarine. Justice 
Field argued in part that the statute impeded "[t]he right to pursue one's 
happiness [which] is placed by the Declaration of Independence among the 
inalienable rights of man, with which all men are endowed, not by ... force of 
legislative or constitutional enactments, but by their Creator .... " Id. at 692. 
55. See WILLIAM G. ROSS, A MUTED FURY: POPULISTS, PROGRESSIVES, AND 
LABOR UNIONS CONFRONT THE COURTS, 1890-1937, at 26-27 (1994) (noting the 
sharp increase between 1880 and 1900 in the number of state court decisions 
striking down legislation); EdwardS. Corwin, The Extension of Judicial Review 
in New York: 1783-1905, 15 MICH. L. REV. 281, 285 (1917) (noting that New 
York state courts invalidated ninety-nine state statutes during the 1890s, more 
than twice the number invalidated during any other decade of the nineteenth 
century); Charles Grove Haines, History of Judicial Review, in CONGRESS OR 
THE SUPREME COURT: WHICH SHALL RULE AMERICA?, supra note 21, at 70 
(arguing that "the decade beginning in 1880 may be regarded as the dividing 
line between the earlier stage when judicial review of legislative enactments 
was of relatively minor significance and the later stage in which this practice 
becomes one of the central and controlling features of the American system of 
government"); James M. Rosenthal, Massachusetts Acts and Resolves Declared 
Unconstitutional by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 1 MAss. L.Q. 
301, 303-15 (1916) (noting that of all the state statutes declared 
unconstitutional by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts between 1804 
and 1915, twenty-eight percent were struck down during the 1890s). 
56. See, e.g., ROSS, supra note 55, at 27 (citing JAMES B. WEAVER, A CALL TO 
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the meantime, lawyers and legal scholars during the 1880s and 
1890s debated the proper scope of judicial review, debates that on 
occasion involved competing interpretations of the Marbury 
decision. 57 Finally, in 1895, the U.S. Supreme Court expressly relied 
on Marbury for the first time to justifY striking down legislation in 
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. 58 The Pollock case would help 
significantly elevate the status of Marbury in American 
constitutional law. 
During the early 1890s, Populists urged a graduated income tax 
to meet the federal budget deficit. 59 Although the tax enacted in 
August 1894 provided for only a two percent tax rate on incomes 
above $4000, it provoked a vituperous response from opponents who 
dismissed it as "class legislation" and ''war upon honest industry."60 
United States Senator David Hill of New York described the tax as 
the work of "anarchists, communists, and socialists."61 John Forrest 
Dillon, a Wall Street lawyer, former state and federal judge, and 
enthusiastic proponent of laissez faire, 62 characterized the tax as 
"class legislation of the most pronounced and vicious type" and 
argued that it was ''violative of the constitutional rights of the 
property owner, subversive of the existing social polity, and 
essentially revolutionary. ,,ro 
Efforts were immediately launched to challenge the 
constitutionality of the new income tax in court on the grounds that 
it was a "direct tax" required under Article I of the Constitution to 
be apportioned among the states based on population. Within 
months, a legal challenge to the tax supported by several of the 
ACTION (1892), which favored limits on judicial power, arguing that judicial 
review "dethrones the people who should be Sovereign and enthrones an 
oligarchy"). 
57. CLINTON, supra note 23, at 166-75. 
58. 157 U.S. 429, 583 (holding unconstitutional tax on income derived from 
real estate), modified, 158 U.S. 601, 637 (1895) (extending principle of the 
earlier decision to income derived from personal property and thereby declaring 
unconstitutional the entire 1894 graduated income tax). 
59. For a discussion of the history of support and opposition to the income 
tax, see Elmer Ellis, Public Opinion and the Income Tax, 1860-1900, 27 MISS. 
VALLEY HIST. REV. 225 (1940). 
60. ld. at 236-38. 
61. Id. at 238. 
62. Dillon was also the author of the late nineteenth-century's most 
authoritative treatise on municipal bonds, Law of Municipal Corporations. 
"Dillon's Rule" provided that cities were completely subject to the will of their 
state legislatures and that federal courts were empowered to enforce this 
subjection if state courts refused to do so. KERMIT L. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR: 
LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 223 (1989). 
63. PAUL, supra note 51, at 164. 
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nation's leading attorneys made its way to the United States 
Supreme Court. Joseph Choate, one of the lawyers who brought the 
litigation challenging the tax, claimed in oral argument before the 
Supreme Court that the tax was "communistic in its purposes and 
tendencies, and is defended here upon principles as communistic, 
socialistic . . . as ever have been addressed to any political assembly 
in the world."64 Choate elaborated: 
I have thought that one of the fundamental objects of all 
civilized government was the preservation of the rights of 
private property. I have thought that it was the very keystone 
of the arch upon which all civilized government rests, and that 
this once abandoned, everything was . . . in danger . . . . 
According to the doctrines that have been propounded here 
this morning, even that great fundamental principle has been 
scattered to the winds.65 
"I do not believe that any member of this court ever has sat or 
ever will sit to hear and decide a case the consequences of which will 
be so far-reaching as this," Choate claimed at the conclusion of his 
oral argument, "not even the venerable member [Justice Stephen 
Field] who survives from the early days of the civil war, and has sat 
upon every question of reconstruction, of national destiny, of state 
destiny that has come up during the last thirty years.'.oo If the Court 
did not intercede, Choate warned, "this communistic march goes 
on.'m 
In closing his oral argument in the Pollock case, Choate 
appealed to both Marbury and John Marshall for support, 
something that litigants in many prior cases challenging the 
constitutionality of legislation that infringed property and contract 
rights had not done.68 Choate urged the Court to act despite popular 
64. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 532 (argument of 
Joseph H. Choate), modified, 158 U.S. 601 (1895). 
65. ld. at 534 (argument of Joseph H. Choate). 
66. Id. at 553 (argument of Joseph H. Choate). 
67. Id. at 533 (argument of Joseph H. Choate). 
68. In earlier cases involving challenges to the constitutionality of various 
federal and state statutes, litigants had not used Marbury to bolster their case. 
For example, the party challenging the constitutionality of a Kansas statute 
prohibiting the manufacture and sale of liquor in Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 
623 (1887), cited a number of cases in support of its argument for an exercise of 
judicial review, including Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798), but not 
Marbury. Brief for Plaintiff in Error at 15-16, 30, Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 
623 (1887). In Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877), the plaintiff cited a number 
of state court cases in support of its argument for an exercise of judicial review, 
but also did not cite Marbury. Brief for Plaintiffs in Error at 28-31, Munn v. 
Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877). For other cases in which parties challenging the 
constitutionality of state legislation did not cite Marbury, see Brief for Plaintiff 
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support for the statute: 
[l]f it be true that a mighty army of sixty million citizens is 
likely to be incensed by this decision, it is the more vital to the 
future welfare of this country that this court again resolutely 
and courageously declare, as Marshall did, that it has the 
power to set aside an act of Congress violative of the 
Constitution, and that it will not hesitate in executing that 
power, no matter what the threatened consequences of popular 
or populistic wrath may be.69 
The income tax appeared to be a constitutional exercise of 
congressional power. In fact, the Court had previously-and 
without dissent-sustained the use of an income tax promulgated 
during the Civil War against an argument that it was a direct tax.70 
But in the two Pollock decisions of the spring of 1895-the first in 
which the Court considered, among other issues, the 
in Error, Budd v. New York, 143 U.S. 517 (1891); Brief for Appellees, Kansas v. 
Ziebold, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). Admittedly, each of these cases involved the 
constitutionality of state legislation for which a citation to Marbury might have 
been less appropriate, but late nineteenth-century litigants challenging the 
constitutionality of congressional legislation also failed to cite Marbury. See 
briefs filed in Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 
(1893); Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888); Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678 
(1887); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 
U.S. 3 (1883); Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879); United States v. Fox, 95 
U.S. 670 (1878); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876). 
69. Pollock, 157 U.S. at 553 (argument of Joseph H. Choate). Choate's 
comments were in response to those of James C. Carter, who defended the 
statute: 
Nothing could be more unwise and dangerous-nothing more foreign 
to the spirit of the Constitution-than an attempt to baffle and defeat 
a popular determination by a judgment in a lawsuit. When the 
opposing forces of sixty millions of people have become arrayed in 
hostile political ranks upon a question which all men feel is not a 
question of law, but of legislation, the only path of safety is to accept 
the voice of the majority as final. 
Id. at 531-32 (argument of James C. Carter). 
70. Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586, 602 (1881) ("Our conclusions 
are, that direct taxes, within the meaning of the Constitution, are only 
capitation taxes, as expressed in that instrument, and taxes on real estate; and 
that the [income] tax of which the plaintiff in error complains is within the 
category of an excise or duty."); see also Francis R. Jones, Pollock v. Farmers' 
Loan and Trust Company, 9 HARV. L. REV. 198, 198 (1895) (concluding that the 
Court in Pollock "deliver[ed] an opinion in which is laid down a doctrine that is 
contrary to what has been accepted as law for nearly one hundred years"). For 
an excellent discussion of the Civil War income tax and the Court's 
consideration of the constitutionality of that tax in Springer, see ROBERT 
STANLEY, DIMENSIONS OF LAW IN THE SERVICE OF ORDER: ORIGINS OF THE 
FEDERAL INCOME TAX, 1861-1913, at 15-99 (1993). 
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constitutionality of taxing income derived from real property and 
the second in which the Court considered the constitutionality of 
taxing income derived from personal property-the Court struck 
down the income tax statute as an unconstitutional direct tax. The 
conservative majority on the Court clearly viewed any type of 
income tax as an attack on propertied interests. In his concurrence, 
Justice Field thundered: "The present assault upon capital is but the 
beginning. It will be but the stepping-stone to others, larger and 
more sweeping, till our political contests will become a war of the 
poor against the rich; a war constantly growing in intensity and 
bitterness."71 Justice John Marshall Harlan later commented that 
Justice Field had "acted often like a mad man during the whole of 
this contest about the income tax."72 
The Pollock dissenters were particularly vitriolic in their 
characterization of the majority's actions. Justice Howell Jackson, 
who had traveled from his Tennessee sickbed to hear reargument on 
the personal property issue, labeled the Court's decision "the most 
disastrous blow ever struck at the constitutional power of 
Congress."73 (Jackson's dissent would be his last opinion; he would 
be dead within three months. 74) Justice Henry Brown characterized 
the Court's decision as "nothing less than a surrender of the taxing 
power to the moneyed class ... fraught with immeasurable danger 
to the future of the country," and a decision that "approaches the 
proportions of a national calamity .... "75 "It is certainly a strange 
commentary upon the Constitution of the United States and upon a 
democratic government," Brown charged, "that Congress has no 
power to lay a tax which is one of the main sources of revenue of 
nearly every civilized State . . . . I hope it may not prove the first 
step toward the submergence of the liberties of the people in a 
sordid despotism of wealth."76 Justice Harlan, pounding the bench 
71. Pollock, 157 U.S. at 607 (Field, J., concurring). 
72. David G. Farrelly, Justice Harlan's Dissent in the Pollock Case, 24 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 175, 179 (1951). 
73. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 706 (1895) 
(Jackson, J., dissenting). 
74. PAUL, supra note 51, at 213. 
75. Pollock, 158 U.S. at 695 (Brown, J., dissenting). 
76. ld. Brown offered a different vision of judicial review than that 
engaged in by the majority: 
I d. 
It is never a light thing to set aside the deliberate will of the 
legislature, and in my opinion it should never be done, except upon 
the clearest proof of its conflict with fundamental law. Respect for the 
Constitution will not be inspired by a narrow and technical 
construction which shall limit or impair the necessary powers of 
Congress. 
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with his fist while delivering his dissent, 77 called the decision "a 
disaster to the country,"78 and predicted in a letter to his sons a few 
weeks later that the decision ''will become as hateful with the 
American people as the Dred Scott case was when it was decided 
. . . . The recent decision will have the effect, if the country 
recognizes it permanently as good law, to make the freemen of 
America the slaves of accumulated wealth."79 Justice Edward White 
rebuked his colleagues in the majority for ignoring clear precedent: 
The conservation and orderly development of our institutions 
rests on our acceptance of the results of the past, and their use 
as lights to guide our steps in the future. Teach the lesson 
that settled principles may be overthrown at any time, and 
confusion and turmoil must ultimately result . . . . If the 
permanency of [the Court's) conclusions is to depend upon the 
personal opinions of those who, from time to time, may make 
up its membership, it will inevitably become a theatre of 
political strife, and its action will be without coherence or 
't 80 conSlS ency. 
Faced with a popular piece of congressional legislation,81 a 
unanimous precedent sustaining an earlier federal income tax,82 and 
bitter division within the Court, Chief Justice Melville Fuller called 
upon the Marbury decision to defend the Court's questionable 
exercise of judicial review. At the outset of his opinion for the Court 
in the real property decision in the case, Fuller made a direct appeal 
to Marbury: 
Since the opinion in Marbury v. Madison ... was delivered, it 
has not been doubted that it is within judicial competency, by 
express provisions of the Constitution or by necessary 
inference and implication, to determine whether a given law of 
the United States is or is not made in pursuance of the 
Constitution, and to hold it valid or void accordingly.83 
Fuller then proceeded to quote at length from Marshall's 
opinion in Marbury: 
"If," said Chief Justice Marshall, "both the law and the 
77. Farrelly, supra note 72, at 177. 
78. Pollock, 158 U.S. at 684 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
79. Quoted in Farrelly, supra note 72, at 180. 
80. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 650-51, modified, 
158 U.S. 601 (1895). 
81. According to one historian of the tax controversy, the 1894 income tax 
was "unquestionably desired by a majority of the voters at that time." Ellis, 
supra note 59, at 242. 
82. See supra note 70. 
83. Pollock, 157 U.S. at 554 (citation omitted). 
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Constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must 
either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding 
the Constitution; or conformably to the Constitution, 
disregarding the law; the court must determine which of these 
conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence 
of judicial duty." And the Chief Justice added that the 
doctrine "that courts must close their eyes on the Constitution, 
and see only the law," "would subvert the very foundation of 
all written constitutions."84 
395 
Fuller's use of the Marbury decision to justify the Court's action 
was unprecedented. Never before in its history had the Court 
deployed the Marbury decision to justify an exercise of judicial 
review. Moreover, during the ninety-two years between Marbury 
and Pollock, the Court had never once seen it necessary when 
declaring a congressional statute unconstitutional to defend its 
power to exercise judicial review by reference to the authority of an 
earlier decision. In all prior cases, the Court merely asserted its 
power to declare a congressional statute unconstitutional without 
specifically citing case authority supporting that course of action.85 
The Court's inaugural use of the Marbury decision to defend an 
exercise of judicial review was saved for an extraordinarily 
controversial decision in which the Court's judgment was highly 
vulnerable to criticism. The Court thus began a pattern that would 
continue in the twentieth century of citing Marbury and quoting 
Chief Justice Marshall when the stakes were particularly high.86 
The Pollock decisions were clearly among the most controversial 
84. Id. (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)). 
85. See Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893); 
Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888); Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678 (1887); 
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 
(1883); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883); Trademark Cases, 100 
U.S. 82 (1879); United States v. Fox, 95 U.S. 670 (1878); United States v. Reese, 
92 U.S. 214 (1876); United States v. R.R. Co., 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 322 (1873); 
United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872); Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. 
(11 Wall.) 113 (1871); United States v. DeWitt, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 41 (1870); 
Justices v. Murray, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 274 (1870); Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. 
(8 Wall.) 603 (1870); The Alicia, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 571 (1869); Reichart v. Felps, 
73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 160 (1868); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867); 
Gordon v. United States, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 561 (1865); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 
60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
86. Moreover, after Pollock, the Court's use of judicial review to void 
legislation sharply increased, particularly state statutes regulating private 
economic activity. Between 1897 and 1937, the Court struck down 209 state 
statutes on Fourteenth Amendment grounds, 176 of which were business 
regulations, a sharp increase from the prior century. CLINTON, supra note 23, 
at 207. By the same token, the Court struck down fifty-five congressional 
statutes during the 1896-1936 time period, far more than during the Court's 
first century. Id. The Court was particularly active declaring state and federal 
statutes unconstitutional during the 1920s. 
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decisions of the late nineteenth century,87 far more controversial 
than Plessy v. Ferguson88 the following term.89 The decisions 
provoked a strong "anti-Court" sentiment across the nation. As 
historian Michael Kammen has noted, after 1895 "the Court ceased 
to be sacred" in the minds of many Americans: "[o]nly in the wake of 
Dred Scott had politicization of the Court been more severe, and 
polarization over constitutional issues more sharp."90 William 
Howard Taft later commented that "[n]othing has ever injured the 
prestige of the Supreme Court more" than the Pollock decisions. 91 
For only the third time in the Court's history, popular reaction led to 
a constitutional amendment reversing a Court decision. 92 Idaho 
Senator William Borah predicted that if the proposed income tax 
amendment failed, "the greatest war in history will be fought 
87. In 1895, the Court issued two other decisions that also provoked a 
public outcry: United States u. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895), in which the 
Court narrowly construed the Sherman Act to uphold the lawfulness of the 
Sugar Trust, and In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895), in which the Court upheld the 
use of a labor injunction against labor leader Eugene Debs. These two 
decisions, along with Pollock, caused many, in the words of one scholar, to view 
the Court not as "a tribunal of justice, whose members sought their guidance 
from the Constitution, the wisdom of the past, and the public conscience, but 
instead a body of appointed men seeking to protect propertied interests by 
rejecting the past and rigging the future." JOHN E . SEMONCHE, CHARTING THE 
FUTURE: THE SUPREME COURT RESPONDS TO A CHANGING SOCIETY, 1890-1920, at 
74 (1978). 
88. 163 u.s. 537 (1896). 
89. As one scholar has noted, the Pollock decisions quickly became "a topic 
of heated discussion in every bank, barbershop, and barroom in the nation." 
Alan Furman Westin, The Supreme Court, The Populist Movement and the 
Campaign of 1896, 15 J . POLITICS 3, 22 (1953); see also Jones, supra note 70, at 
198 ("No case of recent times has occasioned so much discussion and notoriety 
as that of Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Company . ... "). 
Press reaction to the Pollock decisions varied widely. The St. Louis 
Post-Dispatch argued that "[t]o-day's decision shows that the corporations and 
plutocrats are as securely intrenched in the Supreme Court as in the lower 
courts which they take such pains to control." Quoted in Ellis, supra note 59, at 
240. The New York Sun, on the other hand, claimed that "[t]he wave of 
socialistic revolution has gone far, but it breaks at the foot of the ultimate 
bulwark set up for the protection of our liberties." ld. at 241. 
90. MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD Go OF ITSELF: THE 
CONSTITUTION IN AMERICAN CULTURE 191-92 (1986). 
91. Quoted in Bruce Ackerman, Taxation and the Constitution, 99 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1, 5 (1999). 
92. The Eleventh Amendment (1798) was promulgated specifically to 
reverse the Court's decision in Chisholm u. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). 
Multiple factors led to the promulgation of the Fourteenth Amendment (1868), 
but the Court's decision in Dred Scott u. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), 
was certainly a primary one. The Pollock decision was reversed by the 
Sixteenth Amendment (1913). 
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around the wreck of the Supreme Court."93 
During the election of 1896, both the Democrats and Populists 
campaigned against the Court, 94 evoking memories of the 1860 
election in which the Court's Dred Scott decision had played an 
important role.95 The 1896 Democratic Party platform demanded a 
curb on the Court's power to review the constitutionality of 
congressional legislation.96 Some called for the impeachment of 
those justices comprising the Pollock majority. Sylvester Pennoyer, 
a former Democratic-Populist governor of Oregon, attacked the 
Pollock decisions in a series of articles in the American Law Review 
in 1896, calling for "the impeachment of the nullifying judges of the 
Supreme Court."97 Recognizing that Chief Justice Fuller had relied 
upon Marbury (and Chief Justice Marshall) to justify the Court's 
exercise of judicial review, Penn oyer attacked Marbury as an 
unprincipled decision and Marshall for introducing 'judicial 
oligarchy'': 
Ever since 1803, when the Supreme Court assumed the right 
to supervise the laws of Congress [citing Marbury], .. . we 
have had a substituted government, under which Congress has 
abrogated the exclusive prerogative of making laws conferred 
upon it by the Constitution. We have, during this time, been 
living under a government not based upon the Federal 
Constitution, but under one created by the plausible 
sophistries of John Marshall. . . . Our constitutional 
government has been supplanted by a judicial oligarchy.98 
93. KAMMEN, supra note 90, at 202-03. 
94. ld. at 191. 
95. ROBERT K. CARR, THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 258 (1942) 
(The Republican platform of 1860 denounced the Dred Scott decision as a 
"dangerous political heresy."). 
96. KERMIT L. HALL, THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW IN 
AMERICAN HISTORY 31 (1985). Historian Carl Degler has noted of the 1896 
election: "The class consciousness and even class hatred that ran through the 
speeches and literature of the presidential campaign of 1896 came close to 
making Justice Field a prophet" for his prediction in his Pollock concurrence of 
a "war of the poor against the rich." CARL DEGLER, THE AGE OF THE ECONOMIC 
REVOLUTION 1876-1900, at 124 (1967). 
97. Sylvester Pennoyer, A Reply to The Foregoing, 29 AM. L. REv. 856, 863 
(1895) [hereinafter Pennoyer, A Reply]. 
98. Sylvester Pennoyer, The Income Tax Decision, and the Power of the 
Supreme Court to Nullify Acts of Congress, 29 AM. L. REV. 550, 557-58 (1895) 
(footnote omitted). Pennoyer made a similar claim in a subsequent article: 
In the case of Marbury v. Madison, the foundation of a government 
was laid, entirely different from that which was laid by the framers of 
the constitution. With sophistical reasoning which may perhaps have 
been equaled, but which certainly was never excelled, Chief Justice 
Marshall educed a thesis changing our constitutional form of 
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The Pollock decisions fueled a spirited debate among legal 
scholars, lawyers, and politicians concerning the merits of judicial 
review that would last well into the twentieth century. For many, 
the Court's exercise of judicial review was a "usurpation" of 
legislative authority;99 for others, a "charter of American liberty. "100 
Defenders of judicial review utilized the 1901 celebration of the 
centennial of John Marshall's appointment as Chief Justice to 
support their cause.101 John Forrest Dillon, a sharp critic of the 
income tax at issue in Pollock, put together a three-volume 
collection of speeches delivered at Marshall commemoration 
ceremonies across the country at the behest of U.S. Supreme Court 
Justice George Shiras, a controversial member of the Pollock 
majority. 102 Justice Shiras encouraged Dillon to take up the project 
government in to a judicial oligarchy .... 
Pennoyer, A Reply, supra note 97, at 862 (footnote omitted); see also Sylvester 
Pennoyer, The Case of Marbury v. Madison, 30 AM. L. REv. 188, 201 (1896) 
(criticizing "the usurpation by the Federal courts of the legislative power"). 
99. For example, in 1898, John Akin, president of Georgia Bar Association, 
lamented the rise of judicial review in his annual address, referring to the 
"frightful ghost of Marshallism" that has been "resurrected in the modern 
Federal judiciary and stalks abroad unmasked." John W. Akin, Aggressions of 
the Federal Courts, 32 AM. L. REv. 669, 696 (1898). Akin claimed that "the vast 
majority of the people, and probably of the bar, believe that the Federal courts 
have usurped powers not lawfully theirs .... " ld.; see also Camm Patteson, The 
Judicial Usurpation of Power, 10 VA. L. REG. 855, 855 (1905) (claiming that "the 
greatest danger which threatens the American republic is the judicial 
usurpation of power"). 
100. CLINTON, supra note 23, at 14; see, e.g., Junius Parker, The Supreme 
Court and Its Constitutional Duty and Power, 30 AM. L. REV. 357, 362 (1896) 
(arguing that "(i]n times of political upheaval, of sectional animosity, of 
Communistic uprising, the nine quiet men who spend their lives away from the 
political field, free from the necessity of demagoguery, constitute ... the very 
sheet-anchor of the institutions of our land"). 
101. Marshall Day celebrations, heavily promoted by the conservative 
American Bar Association, were held in February 1901 in thirty-eight states 
and the District of Columbia; ceremonies in the U.S. Capitol building were 
attended by members of Congress, the Supreme Court, and the diplomatic 
corps. KAMMEN, supra note 90, at 209-10; 2 LIFE, CHARACTER AND JUDICIAL 
SERVICES, supra note 3, at 124. 
102. The vote in the first Pollock decision striking down the taxation of 
income derived from real property had been six to two, but the Court had 
divided four to four on the question of income derived from personal property 
and so scheduled reargument. The tally of how each justice voted on the 
personal property issue was not !lisclosed. Justice Jackson, absent from the 
deliberations and vote in the first decision, was present for the reargument and 
voted to sustain the tax as it pertained to income derived from personal 
property. Given that four justices had voted earlier to sustain the tax with 
respect to income from personal property, Jackson's vote appeared to provide a 
fifth vote to sustain the tax. But the second Pollock decision declared the tax on 
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so as to establish "a consensus of opinion concerning Marshall on the 
part of eminent lawyers in all parts of the country."103 Dillon's three-
volume set of speeches from Marshall Day celebrations provides a 
fascinating snapshot of the emergence of both Marbury and 
Marshall as important reference points in the defense of judicial 
review, as well as the coming of age of Marbury as a "great case." 
The Marshall commemoration became a convenient forum for 
proponents of judicial review to appropriate Marshall's status to 
their cause. In fact, Marshall Day speakers devoted considerably 
more attention to Marbury than to any other Marshall opinion, 
including McCulloch v. Maryland.104 With the recent controversies 
over the use of judicial review to protect private property from 
Populist legislative encroachment clearly in mind, Dillon, in his 
introduction to the three-volume set, asserted the profound 
importance of Marbury: 
And what a change Marshall wrought [in Marbury]! The 
popular notions a century ago were deeply tinctured with the 
doctrines and theories engendered by the French Revolution-
the supreme and uncontrollable right of the people to govern. 
Marbury's Case opened a new chapter in the history of 
constitutional governments. That decision said to Congress, 
... "if you enact a law in conflict with the Constitution it is 
utterly void, and the court, although only a co-ordinate 
department, has the right under the Constitution so to decide, 
and such decision is authoritative and final, binding 
throughout the land upon States and people." ... Verily a new 
charter of individual rights and liberties was here 
1 . d 105 proc mme . 
This rhetorical connection between Marbury and the protection 
of liberty was deployed by other speakers as well. Georgia attorney 
income derived from personal property unconstitutional on a five to four vote. 
Thus, one justice, whose identity was unknown, changed his vote between the 
first and second decisions. The culprit was widely believed to be Justice Shiras. 
As historian Arnold Paul notes, "Shiras was soon subjected to an outpouring of 
violent obloquy by the supporters of the income tax, furious that one man's 
vacillation should have wrecked the whole tax." PAUL, supra note 51, at 214. 
Historians have subsequently questioned whether in fact Shiras was the guilty 
party. Id. at 215-16. 
103. 1 LIFE, CHARACTER AND JUDICIAL SERVICES, supra note 3, at viii. 
104. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). In his introduction to the three-volume 
set of Marshall speeches, Dillon commented on the substantial attention given 
in those speeches to Marbury: "[i]t was inevitable that on Marshall Day 
renewed attention should be called to the original and distinctively American 
feature in our governmental polity which Jefferson called the judicial veto."' 1 
LIFE, CHARACTER AND JUDICIAL SERVICES, supra note 3, at XX. 
105. 1 id. at xviii. 
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Burton Smith called the Marbury decision an "epoch in the world's 
history" and a "bulwark of liberty and civilization, towering above 
all others erected by the Anglo-Saxon race!"106 
Among the speeches celebrating Marshall's appointment in 
Dillon's volumes was a lengthy one by a New York lawyer, Bourke 
Cockran. After lauding Marshall's decision in Marbury for 
establishing "the most extraordinary feature of our political system," 
Cockran made the unsupportable claim that "[n)ever has the 
Supreme Court exercised its supreme power of setting aside a law of 
Congress or of a State that the people did not sustain its course with 
substantial unanimity,"107 ignoring the fact that several of the 
Court's recent exercises of judicial review, as in Pollock, had 
provoked strong opposition. 108 Cockran went on to belittle legislative 
bodies: "the close of the nineteenth century witnessed a decline in 
the popularity of those parliamentary institutions which, at its 
beginning, were universally believed to be the sure panacea for all 
social or economic ills."109 In contrast, Cockran extolled the 
judiciary, describing it as the one branch of government "untainted 
by any breath of suspicion, to which the people are so passionately 
attached that the slightest attempt to disturb its independence or 
even to review its decisions at the ballot box would be the ruin of the 
political party suggesting it. "110 Though the legislative branch may 
create conditions in which "industry languishes, prosperity withers, 
civilization itself is imperiled," the people are safe, Cockran argued, 
106. 2 id. at 122. See also supra text accompanying notes 3-5 for additional 
comments about the Marbury decision offered at the Marshall Day celebrations. 
107. 1 LIFE, CHARACTER AND JUDICIAL SERVICES, supra note 3, at 416. 
108. Other prominent defenders of judicial review also promoted the fiction 
that its exercise was non-controversial. Joseph Choate, the attorney who 
successfully challenged the federal income tax in the Pollock case, addressed a 
London audience in 1903 while serving as the U.S. ambassador to the Court of 
St. James on the role of the Supreme Court in the American constitutional 
system. Choate claimed that although the Supreme Court since 1791 had 
declared numerous state and federal statutes unconstitutional, "in each 
instance there has been complete and peaceful acquiescence in the decision," a 
claim contradicted by the adverse popular reaction to cases such as Dred Scott, 
the Civil Rights Cases, and Pollock. Joseph H. Choate, The Supreme Court of 
the United States: Its Place in the Constitution, 176 N. AM. REV. 927, 935-36 
(1903). 
109. 1 LIFE, CHARACTER AND JUDICIAL SERVICES, supra note 3, at 416-17. 
Cockran elaborated: "In this county [sic], representative bodies have not 
escaped the disrepute which has overtaken them in other lands. With us 
corruption is sometimes attributed to Congress, quite generally to State 
legislatures, universally to municipal councils. . . . When Parliament is 
supreme, corruption of legislative bodies undermines the life of the whole 
State." 1 id. at 417-18. 
110. 1 id. at 417. 
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because of the courts and their willingness to embrace principles of 
judicial review developed by Marshall in Marbury: ''while the courts 
remain true to the example and precepts of Marshall, all the 
essential rights of the citizen are as secure as the earth under his 
feet-they can no more be invaded than the stars in heaven can be 
blotted from his gaze."m 
One cannot read these three volumes of tributes to Marshall 
without being struck by the fact that a significant portion of the elite 
American bar in 1901 now recognized the Marbury decision as 
central to their defense of judicial review. Indeed, those eager to roll 
back the tide of legislative excess deployed Marbury with 
considerable rhetorical force. In the process, the profile of the 
Marbury decision in the American legal consciousness soared; by the 
early twentieth century, the decision ''had gained almost religious 
acceptance" among conservative lawyers "because it said just what 
they wanted to hear."112 Not surprisingly, some of the speakers at 
the 1901 commemoration of Marshall's appointment suggested that 
there be "another centennial in 1903 to celebrate Marbury v. 
Madison properly."113 
By the same token, the conservative bar sought to enhance John 
Marshall's stature and to use that stature (along with his 
authorship of Marbury) in the defense of judicial review.114 Marshall 
certainly enjoyed prominence throughout the nineteenth century, 115 
111. 1 id. at 418. Cockran elaborated: 
Has not the general welfare been promoted beyond the wildest hopes 
of the fathers since the security of property encourages industry to 
wring measureless abundance from a fruitful soil? Are not the 
blessings of liberty . . . beyond fear of invasion or danger of 
abridgement by the effective protection which the judiciary casts over 
the essential rights of every citizen? 
1 id. at 419. 
112. DONALD 0. DEWEY, MARSHALL VERSUS JEFFERSON: THE POLITICAL 
BACKGROUND OF MARBURYV. MADISON 183 (1970). 
113. Id. at 184. The conservative bar, in particular the American Bar 
Association, also launched a "campaign of education" during the first decade of 
the twentieth century whereby they attempted to "convince the public that 
judges merely declare the law and have no part in the making of it." TWISS, 
supra note 38, at 146. These efforts were meant to counteract the criticism of 
Progressive critics of judicial activism. I d. at 146-4 7. 
114. As Donald Dewey has noted, the "various celebrations in 1901 of the 
centennial of John Marshall's appointment worshiped John Marshall and 
judicial review as one." DEWEY, supra note 112, at 184. 
115. As Michael Kammen has noted, "Marshall's prestige remained high" 
during the nineteenth century, but "[e]ven so, he was not a cynosure of 
attention during the half century following his death in 1835." KAMMEN, supra 
note 90, at 209. Although a statue of Marshall was completed and presented to 
the United States Supreme Court for display in 1884 and a Marshall biography 
appeared in 1885, Marshall would not gain the lofty status that he enjoys today 
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but as Kent Newmyer has noted, "Marshall's incorporation into the 
conservative constitutional construct of the late nineteenth century 
helped consolidate his mythic status."116 In the early years of the 
twentieth century, Marshall's home in Richmond was saved from 
destruction and given to the Association for the Preservation of 
Virginia Antiquities which opened the home to the public in 1913 as 
"a shrine of American constitutionalism."117 In his 1908 classic study 
Constitutional Government, Woodrow Wilson called Marshall "[b]y 
corrunon consent the most notable and one of the most statesmanlike 
figures in our whole judicial history .... "118 Marshall enjoyed 
considerably more attention from biographers during the early 
twentieth century than he had during the nineteenth century; in 
fact, with the publication of Albert Beveridge's magisterial four-
volume biography of Marshall during the second decade of the 
twentieth century, the hagiography of the great Chief Justice was 
complete.119 
The Supreme Court joined the 1901 celebration of both 
Marshall and the Marbury decision. Several of the justices, 
including Chief Justice Melville Fuller and Justices David Brewer 
and Horace Gray, each a member of the Pollock majority, gave 
until early in the twentieth century. Id.; see ALLAN B. MAGRUDER, JOHN 
MARSHALL (1885). 
116. R. KENT NEWMYER, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE HEROIC AGE OF THE 
SUPREME COURT 473 (2001). But some contemporaries offered a different 
construction of Marshall. New York lawyer Louis B. Boudin, in an important 
1911 article in the Political Science Quarterly, argued that Marshall's greatness 
lay not in his articulation of judicial review but in his expansive interpretation 
of the powers of Congress: 
In my opinion Marshall's great place in the history of our country is 
due, not to any doctrine of the limitations of the legislative power, 
which others deduced from that decision more than half a century 
later and with but doubtful warrant, but to the liberal spirit in which 
he interpreted, and thus helped to develop, the legislative powers of 
Congress. 
Boudin, supra note 12, at 256. 
117. Quoted in KAMMEN, supra note 90, at 209. 
118. WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 
158 (1908). 
119. 1-4 ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL (Vols. 1-2 1916, 
Vols. 3-4 1919). In 1919, the distinguished political scientist Edward S. Corwin 
published a favorable biography of Marshall, although Corwin criticized 
Marshall's Marbury decision for declaring section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 
1789 unconstitutional. EDWARD S. CORWIN, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE 
CONSTITUTION: A CHRONICLE OF THE SUPREME COURT (1919). Corwin wrote of 
Marshall: "Marshall established judicial review; he imparted to an ancient legal 
tradition a new significance; he made his Court one of the great political forces 
of the country; he founded American Constitutional Law .... " Id. at 230. 
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Marshall Day speeches extolling Marbury and judicial review. 120 
Fuller, in fact, addressed his remarks to a joint session of Congress, 
the first time a Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court 
had ever done so. 121 
In the meantime, the justices began to utilize the Marbury 
decision with greater regularity to support exercises of judicial 
review. For example in early 1901, as the nation commemorated 
Marshall's appointment, Justice Brewer wrote an opinion in 
Fairbank v. United States122 in which the Court struck down another 
federal tax on constitutional grounds. Early in his opinion for the 
Court, Justice Brewer quoted at length from Marbury's discussion of 
judicial review (which Brewer characterized as "forcibly declared by 
Chief Justice Marshall") to justify the Court's actions.123 A few 
weeks later, Chief Justice Fuller wrote a dissenting opinion in 
Downes v. Bidwell, 124 a case in which the Court sustained the 
constitutionality of a federal statute governing Puerto Rico. Chief 
Justice Fuller deployed Marbury to support his argument for an 
exercise of judicial review: "[f]rom Marbury v. Madison to the 
present day, no utterance of this court has intimated a doubt that 
... the national government is a government of enumerated powers, 
the exercise of which is restricted to the use of means appropriate 
.. . to constitutional ends."12s Two years later, when the Court 
declined in a narrow vote to hold unconstitutional a federal statute 
prohibiting the movement of lottery tickets between states, Chief 
Justice Fuller, writing for four dissenting justices, relied on 
Marbury to support the argument that the Court should declare the 
statute in question unconstitutional. 126 During the eight years since 
Pollock, the Court's activist justices had helped solidify the 
connection between Marbury and judicial review. 
Thereafter, the Court would reaffirm this connection. In a 1911 
120. Justice Gray, for example, gave considerable emphasis to Marbury , 
which he described as "[o]ne of the earliest and most important judgments of 
Marshall." 1 LIFE, CHARACTER AND JUDICIAL SERVICES, supra note 3, at 66. 
Chief Justice Fuller claimed that the Constitution "exclusively committed [to 
the judiciary] the ultimate construction of the Constitution." 1 id. at 4. 
121. Michael J. Gerhardt, The Lives of John Marshall, 43 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1399, 1412 (2002). 
122. 181 U.S. 283 (1901). 
123. Id. at 285-86. 
124. 182 u.s. 244 (1901). 
125. /d. at 359 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting). 
126. Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 372 (1903) (Fuller, C.J., dissenting) 
("The Constitution gives no countenance to the theory that Congress is vested 
with the full powers of the British Parliament, and ... is the sole judge of their 
extent and application; and the decisions of this court from the beginning have 
been to the contrary." (citing and quoting Marbury) ). 
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opinion in which the Court found a congressional statute conferring 
jurisdiction unconstitutional, Justice William Day asked: ''When 
may this court ... pass upon the constitutional validity of an act of 
Congress?"127 Answering for a unanimous Court, Day noted that 
"[t]hat question has been settled from the early history of the court, 
the leading case on the subject being Marbury v. Madison."128 In 
1926, Chief Justice William Howard Taft described the Marbury 
decision as "one of the great landmarks in the history of the 
construction of the Constitution of the United States, and is of 
supreme authority . . . in respect to the power and duty of the 
Supreme Court and other courts to consider and pass upon the 
validity of acts of Congress .... "129 
Constitutional law treatises published after 1900 bore a very 
different quality with respect to judicial review and the importance 
of Marbury in comparison with their nineteenth-century 
predecessors. Almost without exception, the status of Marbury is 
significantly elevated. Most early twentieth-century treatises 
devoted a separate section to a discussion of the case. For example, 
University of Illinois law dean Albert Putney, in his 1908 treatise, 
United States Constitutional History and Law, labeled the decision 
in Marbury "among the most important ever rendered by the 
Supreme Court"-a claim no nineteenth-century treatise could or 
did make-and devoted a section of his treatise to a discussion of the 
case.130 Westel Willoughby, a political scientist at Johns Hopkins 
University, opened his two-volume 1910 treatise, The Constitutional 
Law of the United States, with a section on "The Courts and 
Unconstitutional Laws," followed by a section on "Marbury v. 
Madison."131 University of Washington political scientist Charles 
Martin published a 1928 text on the American Constitution; his 
chapter ''The Power of the Supreme Court to Set Aside Acts of 
Congress" was comprised entirely of a discussion of Marbury. 132 
127. Muskrat v . United States, 219 U.S. 346, 357 (1911). 
128. ld. 
129. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 139 (1926). 
130. ALBERT H. PUTNEY, UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND LAW 
§ 193 (1908). 
131. 1 WESTEL WOODBURY WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES 2-4 (1910). 
132. CHARLES E. MARTIN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION: A STUDY OF THE FORMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM AND OF THE IDEALS UPON WHICH IT IS BASED WITH 
ILLUSTRATIVE MATERIALS 111-13 (1928); see also 2 JOHN RANDOLPH TUCKER, THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: A CRITICAL DISCUSSION OF ITS GENESIS, 
DEVELOPMENT, AND INTERPRETATION 754 (Henry St. George Tucker ed., 1899) 
(Washington and Lee law professor John Tucker, in his posthumously published 
1899 constitutional law treatise, grounded his discussion of judicial review in 
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Constitutional law casebooks of the late nineteenth century 
generally did not emphasize Marbury v. Madison. In his landmark 
1894 constitutional law casebook, for example, Harvard law 
professor James Bradley Thayer included Marbury as one of the 
cases that his students would read on the topic "Written 
Constitutions in the United States," but placed no special emphasis 
on the decision. Thayer's students read an array of materials in 
addition to Marbury that addressed judicial review, including four 
state court decisions from the 1780s, Federalist Number 78, a 
federal circuit court opinion from 1795, and the famous 1825 
critique of judicial review by Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice 
John Gibson in Eakin v. Raub133 which Thayer characterized as "the 
ablest discussion of [judicial review] which I have ever seen."134 In 
fact, in his landmark 1893 article in the Harvard Law Review on 
American constitutional law, Thayer labeled Marbury an 
"overpraised" decision.135 Two years after Thayer published his 1894 
casebook, University of Minnesota law professor John Day Smith 
published another constitutional casebook in which he omitted the 
Marbury decision altogether. 136 
But those constitutional law casebooks published after the turn 
of the twentieth century featured Marbury as a significant case. 
Emlin McClain, Chancellor of the Law Department of the University 
of Iowa, published a Selection of Cases on Constitutional Law in 
1900; McClain's section on "Judicial Restraints on Legislative 
Encroachments" was comprised entirely of the Marbury decision.137 
University of Chicago Law Dean James Parker Hall's 1913 
"the masterly judgment of the great Chief Justice in the case of Marbury u. 
Madison."). 
One constitutional law treatise of the early twentieth century did not 
give Marbury preeminent status in its discussion of judicial review. Ohio 
attorney David Watson published a two-volume constitutional law treatise in 
1910. Although Watson discusses "the great case of Marbury u. Madison" in the 
context of a larger discussion of "Judicial Power Over Legislation," he does not 
feature Marbury as the central case establishing the principle of judicial review. 
2 DAVID K. WATSON, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS HISTORY 
APPLICATION AND CONSTRUCTION 1182 (1910). 
133. 12 Serg. & Rawle 330, 344-45 (Pa. 1825). 
134. THAYER, supra note 11, at 48-206; Thayer, supra note 14, at 130 n.l. 
135. Thayer, supra note 14, at 130 n.l. 
136. JOHN DAY SMITH, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1896). But in 1898, 
Chicago attorney Carl Evans Boyd did publish a constitutional law casebook 
which opened with a chapter entitled "The Validity of Legislation" which was 
comprised entirely of the Marbury decision. CARL EVANS BOYD, CASES ON 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 17-25 (1898). 
137. EMLIN MCCLAIN, A SELECTION OF CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 815-18 
(1900). 
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casebook, Cases on Constitutional Law, featured Marbury in its 
section on "Power to Declare Statutes Unconstitutional" following an 
excerpt from the Federalist Papers.138 Dean Hall's 1914 Illustrative 
Cases on Constitutional Law opened its chapter on "Construction 
and Interpretations of Constitutions" with the Marbury decision.139 
In 1916, the Harvard Government Department produced a volume 
entitled Leading Cases on the Constitution of the United States for 
use in teaching government classes at the university. The volume 
included eighteen cases and began with Marbury v. Madison. 140 
Finally, litigants challenging the constitutionality of legislation 
before the Supreme Court in the early twentieth century featured 
the Marbury decision in their briefing, a practice not followed in the 
nineteenth century.141 For example, in Adair v. United States, 142 a 
case involving the constitutionality of a congressional statute 
banning "yellow dog'' contracts, the petitioner included a section in 
his brief entitled "The Duty of the Courts as to Unconstitutional 
Acts of Congress" that featured a lengthy discussion of Marbury. 143 
Litigants in several other early twentieth-century cases did 
likewise. 144 
138. JAMES PARKER HALL, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW WITH SUPPLEMENT 
SELECTED FROM DECISIONS OF STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 28-31 (1913, 1926). 
139. JAMES PARKER HALL, ILLUSTRATIVE CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 8-11 
(1914). 
140. LEADING CASES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 1-6 
(Harvard Univ. ed., 1916). For other examples, see Harvard Law Professor 
Eugene Wambaugh's A Selection of Cases on Constitutional Law which 
reproduced the Marbury decision in its inaugural chapter on "The Distinction 
Between Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Powers," EuGENE WAMBAUGH, A 
SELECTION OF CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 23-33 (1915), and Cornell 
Government Professor Robert Cushman's Leading Constitutional Decisions in 
which Cushman opened his chapter on "The Judiciary" with Marbury. ROBERT 
EUGENE CUSHMAN, LEADING CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS 155-61 (revised ed. 
1929). 
But not every early twentieth-century constitutional law casebook 
treated Marbury in this fashion. Philadelphia attorneys H. Edgar Barnes and 
Byron A. Milner published a constitutional law casebook in 1910. They 
included Marbury, but in the section that addressed "The President's Power of 
Appointment." H. EDGAR BARNES & BYRON A. MILNER, SELECTED CASES IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 31-36 (7th ed. 1924). St. John's University law professor 
Maurice Finkelstein published a 1927 constitutional law treatise in which he 
included Marbury in the section on "Political Questions." MAURICE 
FINKELSTEIN, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 88 (1927). 
141. See supra note 68 for examples of nineteenth-century litigants that did 
not rely on Marbury. 
142. 208 u.s. 161 (1908). 
143. Brief for Plaintiff in Error at 43-44, Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 
161 (1908) (No. 293). 
144. See Brief for Appellees at 56-57, Adkins v. Children's Hasp., 216 U.S. 
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To be sure, many lawyers and scholars of the early twentieth 
century continued to criticize both Marbury and the principle of 
judicial review.145 Moreover, between 1898 and 1921, Congress 
considered six bills to limit the power of the Supreme Court, 
including legislation that would have required a supermajority of 
justices to invalidate legislation; between 1922 and 1924, Congress 
considered eleven additional such bills. 146 At the same time, many 
state legislatures provided for judicial recall and imposed 
restrictions on judicial review.147 But judicial review would survive 
and over the course of the twentieth century would become an 
increasingly prominent feature of the American constitutional 
system. 
IV. MARBURY SINCE THE ONSET OF THEW ARREN COURT 
During the last half-century, aspects of the Marbury decision 
have continued to come under sharp criticism from legal scholars.148 
But since the onset of the Warren Court, the Court has cited 
Marbury for the principle of judicial review far more frequently than 
at any comparable time in the Court's history.149 Particularly when 
525 (1923) (Nos. 795, 796) (citing Marbury for principle of judicial review); Brief 
for Defendant-in-Error at 43-44, Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 
(1922) (No. 657) (citing Marbury for the principle of judicial review); Brief on 
the Part of the Plaintiff in Error at 35-37, Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 
204 (1919) (No. 685) (quoting Marbury at length to support exercise of judicial 
review). 
145. See, e.g., Ross, supra note 55, at 49-69 (describing various critics of 
judicial review during the first two decades of the twentieth century); Boudin, 
supra note 12, at 248 (arguing in 1911 that the Constitution did not provide for 
judicial review); Walter Clark, Some Myths of the Law, 13 MICH. L. REV. 26, 30-
31 (1914) (describing as a "myth" the notion that "courts have the power to set 
aside an act of Congress, or of a state legislature" and that "[i]t has no validity 
apart from the acquiescence or toleration which has been accorded it"). 
146. SEMONCHE, supra note 87, at 425. 
147. For example, in the early twentieth century, five states amended their 
constitutions to provide for judicial recall; Ohio amended its constitution to 
provide that the Ohio Supreme Court could not declare a state statute 
unconstitutional if more than one justice dissented. Clark, supra note 145, at 
32. 
148. For one of the more compelling and influential critiques of Marbury, see 
William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE 
L.J. 1 (1969). 
149. Justice Hugo Black, in particular, cited "the great opinion of Chief 
Justice Marshall in Marbury u. Madison" with great regularity. Clay v. Sun 
Ins. Office, Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 223 (1960) (Black, J., dissenting). Frequently, 
when Black dissented from an exercise of judicial review, he would nevertheless 
articulate his fidelity not merely to the principle of judicial review, but 
specifically to Marshall's decision in Marbury. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 
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the Court has engaged in (or declined to engage in) a controversial 
exercise of judicial review, justices on both sides of the issue have 
tended to cite Marbury as support for their position. 150 This 
tendency to cite Marbury in high-profile cases shows no sign of 
abating. In several of the most controversial exercises of judicial 
review of the past decade, including United States v. Lopez, 151 City of 
Boerne v. Flores,152 and United States v. Morrison, 153 the Court 
U.S. 254, 274 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting) (in dissenting from Court's holding 
that procedures in connection with termination of welfare benefits are 
unconstitutional, Black affirms that "Marbury u. Madison held, and properly, I 
think, that courts must be the final interpreters of the Constitution" (citation 
omitted)); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 397 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting) 
(in dissenting from Court's holding that a city charter violates the equal 
protection clause, Black states that "[o)f course the Court under the ruling of 
Marbury v. Madison has power to invalidate state laws that discriminate on 
account of race" (citation omitted)); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 513 
(1965) (Black, J., dissenting) (noting that though he disagreed with the 
majority's use of judicial review to strike down the Connecticut birth control 
law, "I completely subscribe to the holding of Marbury v. Madison, that our 
Court has constitutional power to strike down statutes" (citations omitted)). In 
fact, Black cited Marbury more frequently than any other member of the Court. 
150. For example, in Garcia u. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 
469 U.S. 528 (1985), an important Tenth Amendment decision, Justice Lewis 
Powell dissented, arguing that the deference given by the majority to Congress 
constituted a rejection of "the role of the judiciary in protecting the States from 
federal overreaching" and disregard for "the teaching of the most famous case in 
our history." Id. at 567 (Powell, J., dissenting); see also City of Rome v. United 
States, 446 U.S. 156, 207 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (in dissenting from a 
decision that Congress did not exceed its constitutional power in enacting the 
Voting Rights Act, Rehnquist argued that "[w)hile the presumption of 
constitutionality is due to any act of a coordinate branch of the Federal 
Government or of one of the States, it is this Court which is ultimately 
responsible for deciding challenges to the exercise of power by those entities. 
Marbury u. Madison"); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 52 (1971) (Court justifies 
refusal to grant equitable relief against prosecution in state court under a state 
statute of questionable constitutionality, noting that although judges have 
"[t)he power and duty ... to declare laws unconstitutional" under Marbury, 
"this vital responsibility ... does not amount to an unlimited power to survey 
the statute books and pass judgment on laws before the courts are called upon 
to enforce them."). 
151. 514 U.S. 549, 578 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[A)s the branch 
whose distinctive duty it is to declare 'what the law is,' Marbury u. Madison, we 
are often called upon to resolve questions of constitutional law not susceptible 
to the mechanical application of bright and clear lines." (citation omitted)). 
152. 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) ("Congress' discretion is not unlimited ... and 
the courts retain the power, as they have since Marbury u. Madison, to 
determine if Congress has exceeded its authority under the Constitution."). 
153. 529 U.S. 598, 617 n.7 (2000) ("No doubt the political branches have a 
role in interpreting and applying the Constitution, but ever since Marbury this 
Court has remained the ultimate expositor of the constitutional text."). 
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embraced Marbury in defense of its decision to strike down popular 
congressional legislation. 154 
But the Court during the past half century has deployed 
Marbury for more ambitious purposes than merely to justify an 
exercise of judicial review. In a number of cases, the Court has used 
Marbury to justify the Court's assertion that its interpretations of 
the Constitution are supreme over those of other governmental 
actors, a claim that Marshall did not make in his Marbury decision. 
This trend began in 1958, when the Court confronted open 
defiance of its earlier decision in Brown v. Board of Education155 by 
governmental authorities in Little Rock, Arkansas, who resisted 
implementation of a school desegregation decree and claimed that 
they were not bound by the Court's interpretation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in the Brown decision. In Cooper v. Aaron,156 the Court, 
engaging in what many scholars have characterized as an expansion 
of the meaning of Marbury, 157 relied on the decision to assert its 
authority as the "supreme" interpreter of constitutional text: 
[W]e should answer the premise of the actions of the Governor 
and Legislature that they are not bound by our holding in the 
Brown case. It is necessary only to recall some basic 
constitutional propositions which are settled doctrine. 
Article VI of the Constitution makes the Constitution the 
"supreme Law of the Land." In 1803, Chief Justice Marshall, 
speaking for a unanimous Court, referring to the Constitution 
as "the fundamental and paramount law of the nation," 
declared in the notable case of Marbury u. Madison that "It is 
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department 
154. Justice Antonin Scalia captured the revered status that Marbury enjoys 
on the current Court in his 1999 defense of the Court's Eleventh Amendment 
jurisprudence in which he characterized critiques of that jurisprudence as 
having been "rejected by constitutional tradition and precedent as clear and 
conclusive, and almost as venerable, as that which consigns debate over 
whether Marbury v. Madison was wrongly decided to forums more otherworldly 
than ours." Call. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. , 
527 U.S. 666, 688 (1999) (citation omitted). 
155. 34 7 u.s. 483 (1954). 
156. 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
157. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE 
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 264 (1962) (criticizing the Court in 
Cooper for claiming that "the Court and only the Court speaks in the name of 
the Constitution"); Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues"-A 
Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 
25 n.155 (1964) (arguing that the Court in Cooper confused "Marshall's 
assertion of judicial authority to interpret the Constitution [in Marbury] with 
judicial exclusiveness"). 
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to say what the law is." This decision declared the basic 
principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition 
of the law of the Constitution, and that principle has ever since 
been respected by this Court and the Country as a permanent 
and indispensable feature of our constitutional system.158 
Since Cooper, the Court has repeatedly used Marbury to 
reaffirm its claim to judicial supremacy. Most recently, in United 
States v. Morrison, 159 Chief Justice William Rehnquist, in language 
evocative of the Court's Cooper decision, announced: "No doubt the 
political branches have a role in interpreting and applying the 
Constitution, but ever since Marbury this Court has remained the 
ultimate expositor of the constitutional text."160 
In politically charged cases taking the Court to the limits of its 
authority, the Court has also utilized Marbury to legitimate its 
actions. For example, in United States v. Nixon, 161 the Court 
confronted the extraordinarily high-stakes task of assessing a claim 
of executive privilege by the President of the United States in a case 
that cut to the heart of the Nixon presidency. The Court noted that 
the President interpreted the Constitution as granting him an 
absolute privilege of confidentiality in all presidential 
communications and conceded that such an interpretation was 
entitled to great respect: "In the performance of assigned 
constitutional duties each branch of the Government must initially 
interpret the Constitution, and the interpretation of its powers by 
any branch is due great respect from the others."162 Choosing to 
reject that broad construction of presidential privilege, the Court 
turned to Marbury for support: "Many decisions of this Court, 
however, have unequivocally reaffirmed the holding of Marbury v. 
Madison that '[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the 
judicial department to say what the law is."'163 Upon reviewing prior 
cases in which the Court had held that federal courts must "on 
occasion interpret the Constitution in a manner at variance with the 
construction given the document by another branch,"164 the Court 
proceeded to "reaffirm that it is the province and duty of this Court 
'to say what the law is' with respect to the claim of privilege 
presented in this case. Marbury v. Madison."165 · 
158. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 17-18 (citation omitted and emphasis added). 
159. 529 u.s. 598 (2000). 
160. Id. at 617 n.7. 
161. 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
162. Id. at 703. 
163. Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Marbury v. 
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)). 
164. Id. at 704 (quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549 (1969)). 
165. Id. at 705 (citation omitted) (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177). 
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Marbury's "icon" status has made it a fascinating rhetorical tool 
in the hands of the justices contesting divisive cases, even ones that 
have nothing to do with judicial review. For example, in 1978, a 
divided Court held in Monell v. Department of Social Services166 that 
local governments were "persons" for purposes of Section 1983 
liability,167 a decision that reversed the Court's 1962 precedent in 
Monroe v. Pape. 168 In dissent, then Justice Rehnquist complained of 
the Court's abandonment of precedent and in particular, Justice 
Lewis Powell's suggestion in a concurring opinion that Monroe was 
owed less deference because the question of municipal liability "was 
never actually briefed or argued in this Court" and resolution of that 
issue was not "necessary to resolve the contentions made in that 
case."
169 
"Private parties must be able to rely upon explicitly stated 
holdings of this Court," Rehnquist chided his colleagues, ''without 
being obliged to peruse the briefs of the litigants to predict the 
likelihood that this Court might change its mind."170 To bolster his 
argument, Rehnquist cleverly suggested that the Court's decision 
and Powell's rationale left the venerable Marbury decision 
vulnerable to reversal: 
To cast such doubt upon each of our cases, from Marbury v. 
Madison forward, in which the explicit ground of decision "was 
never actually briefed or argued," (Powell, J., concurring), 
would introduce intolerable uncertainty into the law. Indeed, 
in Marbury itself, the argument of Charles Lee on behalf of the 
applicants . . . devotes not a word to the question of whether 
this Court has the power to invalidate a statute duly enacted 
by the Congress.171 
Finally, Chief Justice Marshall's language in Marbury that 
"[t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of 
every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he 
166. 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
167. Id. at 662-63. 
168. 365 u.s. 167 (1961). 
169. Monell, 436 U.S. at 708-09 (Powell, J., concurring). 
170. Id. at 717-18 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
171. Id. at 718 (citations omitted). In a similar vein, Justice Scalia, in his 
dissent in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), criticized as 
"contrived" the plurality's use of stare decisis pursuant to which it retained only 
the "central holding" of Roe v. Wade. Id. at 993 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia 
questioned whether the plurality's analysis might affect the Court's decision in 
Marbury: "I wonder whether, as applied to Marbury v. Madison, for example, 
the new version of stare decisis would be satisfied if we allowed courts to review 
the constitutionality of only those statutes that (like the one in Marbury ) 
pertain to the jurisdiction of the courts." I d. (citation omitted). 
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receives an injury"172 has been used by various justices to justifY the 
establishment of private rights of action under constitutional 
provisions173 or to criticize the Court for refusing to provide a remedy 
for a constitutional violation where no specific remedy has been 
provided by a coordinate branch of government. 174 
172. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). 
173. See, e.g., Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 242 (1979) (holding that the 
plaintiff has a private right of action under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment to sue a Member of Congress for sex discrimination, quoting Chief 
Justice Marshall in Marbury that "[t)he very essence of civil liberty certainly 
consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, 
whenever he receives an injury"); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the 
Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971) (holding that the plaintiff 
has a private right of action under the Fourth Amendment, quoting Chief 
Justice Marshall in Marbury). 
Justices critical of implied rights of action have also used Marbury to 
defend their position. In Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979), 
Justice Powell dissented from the Court's finding a private right of action under 
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, noting that: 
[w)hile '[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial 
department to say what the law is,' Marbury v. Madison, it is 
equally-and emphatically-the exclusive province of the Congress 
not only to formulate legislative policies and mandate programs and 
projects, but also to establish their relative priority for the Nation. 
ld. at 744 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194-95 
(1978) (citation omitted)). 
174. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 978 & n.36 (1984) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court's holding that the exclusionary 
rule does not apply to evidence seized by officers relying on a warrant that is 
subsequently determined to be defective; arguing that the Court should not 
"concede the existence of a constitutional violation for which there is no 
remedy," and quoting Marbury to the effect that "[t)he very essence of civil 
liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection 
of the laws, whenever he receives an injury"); Hobby v. United States, 468 U.S. 
339, 359 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court's holding that 
even if a judge engaged in unconstitutional racial discrimination in the 
selection of a grand jury foreman, dismissal of indictment is unwarranted; 
accuses the Court of refusing to apply the "elementary, though oft-ignored, 
principle that every right must be vindicated by an effective remedy" (citing 
Marbury)); Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 368 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(criticizing the Court's holding that police officers have absolute immunity from 
damages for perjured testimony at a criminal trial, quoting Marbury to the 
effect that "[t)he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of 
every individual to claim the protections of the laws, whenever he receives an 
injury"); Wheedlin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 656 (1963) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (criticizing the Court's holding that plaintiff has no cause of action 
for abuse of subpoena power by federal officer, citing Marbury v. Madison for 
"the settled principle of the accountability, in damages, of the individual 
governmental officer for the consequences of his wrongdoing"). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Marbury v. Madison is now nndisputably one of "the great 
cases" of American constitutional law, nndeniably associated with 
the principle of judicial review.175 But Marbury's greatness cannot 
be attributed to the pathbreaking character of the decision. Rather, 
Marbury has become great because, over the years, proponents of an 
expansive doctrine of judicial review have needed it to assume 
greatness. 
175. As one historian of the Marbury decision has noted: "Right or not, 
flawed or not, Marbury u. Madison has become the symbol of American judicial 
review ... . How long (judicial review] will survive ... will depend on the use 
which judges of the future will make of the power for which Marbury u. 
Madison has been the rationalization and symboL" DEWEY, supra note 112, at 
185-86. 
